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Since the early 1990s, the number of papers estimating econometric models and using other 
quantitative techniques to try to understand different aspects of the Chinese economy has 
mushroomed. A common feature of some of these studies is the use of neoclassical theory as the 
underpinning for the empirical implementations. It is often assumed that factor markets are 
competitive, that firms are profit maximizers, and that these firms respond to the same incentives 
that firms in market economies do. Many researchers find that the Chinese economy can be well 
explained using the tools of neoclassical theory. In this paper, we (1) review two examples of 
estimation of the rate of technical progress, and (2) discuss one attempt at modeling investment. 
We identify their shortcomings and the problems with the alleged policy implications derived. 
We show that econometric estimation of neoclassical models may result in apparently sensible 
results for misinformed reasons. We conclude that modeling the Chinese economy requires a 
deeper understanding of its inner workings as both a transitional and a developing economy. 
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How much economic analysis is applicable to China? Most, I believe 





In this paper we raise some questions regarding the methodology and approaches used to model 
various aspects of the Chinese economy. In particular, we question how an important part of the 
literature on China has advanced since the early 1990s. Although there is a wide variety of 
papers using diverse methodologies and techniques, there is a strand of this literature that has 
taken an approach that we think must be carefully analyzed and evaluated.
 1 By “economic 
analysis” in the quotation above, Chow did not mean any economic analysis, but orthodox 
neoclassical economic analysis. In the same article, Chow concluded: “The above examples have 
illustrated the proposition that most of existing economic analysis is applicable to China […] 
Before new tools are developed for China, one should understand the usefulness as well as the 
limitations of the existing tools” (Chow 1994: 133; italics added).
2 Indeed, it seems that as China 
becomes a more market-oriented economy, many researchers appear to believe that the methods 
and models of neoclassical economics are the appropriate ones to understand the Chinese 
economy. Likewise, application of the latest econometric techniques to modeling different 
aspects of the Chinese economy has become standard. 
The objective of this paper is to discuss if Chow’s approach toward understanding the 
Chinese economy is useful. As many assumptions underlying neoclassical economics (e.g., profit 
maximization; marginal productivity theory of factor pricing) do not appear to conform to what 
is known about the Chinese economy, in this paper we discuss what we view are some serious 
limitations of a number of the “existing tools.” As readers and researchers of the China 
economics literature, we perceive an almost permanent tension between the premises inherent in 
the models of neoclassical economics and their application to the Chinese economy, often 
pushed through corset justifications. For example, Hu and Khan’s (1997) justification for using 
                                                 
1 One important caveat: we do not claim that all work on China suffers from the problems that we discuss this paper. 
2 In this paper Chow argued as follows: “The evidence has suggested that the Cobb-Douglas production function fits 
the data for Chinese state-owned industry very well” (Chow 1994: 125); “This theory [theory of consumer behavior] 
appears to be universal, being applicable to China as well as other countries” (Chow 1994:125). He also applied the 
quantity theory of money and the accelerator theory to model investment.   2
growth accounting is most unconvincing from a methodological point of view. After stating that 
“the estimates of productivity growth for China may be biased in either direction if there are 
deviations from the assumptions imposed by the adopted methodology” they continue: 
“However, since this methodology is widely used in studying sources of economic growth for 
members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the newly 
industrialized economies of East Asia, and many developing countries with divergent income 
levels and economic structures, it is of interest certainly as a first step, to apply the same analysis 
to the Chinese economy to obtain what could be viewed as a ‘benchmark’ estimates” (Hu and 
Khan 1997: 108); see Felipe and McCombie (2001, 2002). 
Other times, authors need to justify perverse findings. For example, Blanchard and 
Giavazzi (2005: table 4) summarize various estimates of total factor productivity (TFP) growth 
for China. They indicate that these estimates are about 3% per year since reforms started, but that 
TFP growth appears to have slowed significantly in recent years. The authors, however, explain 
that the finding of a low TFP growth is compatible with a very high GDP growth:  
 
The implication of this computation should not be however that 
there is no technological progress in China. The assumption 
underlying the computation is that factors are paid their 
marginal products. If, in fact, capital has been misallocated, then 
contrary to this assumption, the marginal productivity of capital 
in those sectors where there has been excessive investment could 
be negative. Therefore, the right way to interpret the 
computation is that, while technological progress is surely 
present, it is partly offset by capital misallocation.  
Blanchard and Giavazzi 2005: 11; italics added) 
 
Although the profession has advanced a great deal in terms of asking questions about the 
performance of the Chinese economy, it has not been advanced enough in terms of asking if the 
peculiarities of the Chinese economy demand radically different theoretical (and perhaps 
empirical) approaches. Certainly, this is not to say that China economists have not discussed 
whether the peculiarities of the Chinese economy call for a specific approach. Qin (2000), for 
example, provided an in-depth review of the state of macro-modeling in transition economies 
with special reference to China and raised serious concerns. 
This somewhat unfortunate tendency in recent years to apply standard neoclassical 
models to the study of the Chinese economy is reinforced by the application of the latest   3
econometric refinements, in particular the analysis of unit roots and cointegration in time-series 
analyses. This has led, at times, to the use of stereotyped theories camouflaged in complicated 
technical devices. The conclusion, in our view, is that a number of China economists seem to 
believe that the models used must explain Chinese economic behavior adequately simply 
because the results obtained are apparently good. This attitude involves an element of 
instrumentalism, the view that (realistic) assumptions do not matter in evaluating a model; what 
matters is its predictive ability. 
To discuss the implications of these problems, we review three examples of how 
modeling and estimating technical progress and investment in China has proceeded. In section 2, 
we review the methods proposed by Wan (1995) and Chow (1993) to quantify technical 
progress. In section 3, we discuss the specification of the neoclassical model of investment 
proposed by He and Qin (2004). We argue that these empirical exercises can be interpreted as 
approximations to accounting identities. Indeed, we shall show that expressions almost identical 
to the models derived in these papers can be obtained by rewriting the income accounting 
identity according to which value-added equals the wage bill plus total profits. It is for this 
reason that the expressions these authors estimated appear to work empirically and thus produce 
seemingly sensible results. However, for being approximations to identities, estimation of these 
models cannot, therefore, reject the null hypotheses that they purport to test. We conclude that if 
knowledge about the Chinese economy is to improve, China economists have to pay serious 
attention to the theories and statistical techniques that they use: not only do they have to be 
relevant to the Chinese reality, but also their testing has to allow statistical rejection. 
 
2. THE MEASUREMENT OF TECHNICAL PROGRESS IN CHINA 
 
In this section, we discuss two attempts at estimating the rate of technical progress in China 
which, in different ways, suffer from the problems mentioned in the introduction, namely, the 
belief that neoclassical economics can explain Chinese economic behavior, and that the methods 
used are no more than approximations to an accounting identity. The first one is that of Wan 
(1995) and the second one is that of Chow (1993). 
 
   4
2.1 Wan’s Measure of Technical Progress 
Wan (1995) proposed a seemingly assumption-free nonparametric approach to estimate the rate 
of  TFPgrowth. The rationale behind Wan’s method was two-fold. First, he pointed out quite 
correctly that the derivation of the traditional growth accounting equation depends on 
assumptions such as profit maximization and perfect competition. These are, most probably, 
inappropriate for a centrally planned economy like China. Second, Wan claimed that the 
conventional approach requires the explicit introduction of time in the production function. This, 
in the words of the author, “precludes the possibility of studying cross-sectional technical 
change” (Wan 1995: 309). As is well known, the standard method to estimate the growth rate of 
TFP—the proxy for the growth of technical progress—is to assume an aggregate production 
function, typically with Hicks-neutral technological progress,  ) K , L ( F A Y t t t t = , where Y  denotes 
output, L is employment, K is the stock of capital,  A is the level of technology, and the 





t t t K ˆ L ˆ Y ˆ α α λ + + = , where the symbol ^ denotes the growth rates of the corresponding 
variables, 
L
t α  and 
K
t α  are the elastcities of output with respect to labor and capital (respectively), 
and  t λ  is the rate of Hicks-neutral technical progress. Assuming profit maximization and 
competitive markets, the factor elasticities are equal to the corresponding factor shares in output 




t t t K ˆ s L ˆ s Y ˆ + + = λ , where 
L
t s  and 
K
t s  are the labor 





t t t K ˆ s L ˆ s Y ˆ − − = λ . 
In order to avoid these problems and define technical change (TE ) appropriately, Wan 
(1995) drew the isoquants of the production function with output  0 Y  as the base year (see figure 
1). The total cost (TC) of producing the observed level of output  0 Y  is definitionally given by 
0 0 0 0 0 0 K r L w TC Y + = = , where w is the average wage rate, L denotes employment, r  is the user 
cost of capital, and K  is the stock of capital, with all values measured in real terms. Isoquant and 
isocost lines intersect at point a ( 0 0 K , L ). Point b( 1 1 K , L ) represents the observed output given 
by another production function, where the functional form has changed because of technical 
change. At b,  1 1 1 1 1 1 K r L w TC Y + = = . Finally, at point c( 2 2 K , L ) the same level of output as at b   5
(i.e.,  2 1 Y Y = ) is produced assuming the same level of technology as at a . In other words, the 
increase in output from  0 Y   to  2 Y  is entirely the result of increased inputs. 
  Technical change is defined as the difference between the cost of producing output  2 Y  at  
c  using the same technology as at  a,  and the cost of producing  1 Y  with a different technology, 
but with the base-year factor prices, i.e.,  0 w  and  0 r . Thus, using the cost identities, the increase 
in total efficiency is given by ) K r L w ( ) K r L w ( TE 1 0 1 0 2 0 2 0 + − + = . Consequently, this definition 
of technical change is the saving in costs resulting from the need to use less inputs at b 
compared with what would have been used at c as a result of benefits of technical progress. 
Since  2 0 2 0 1 K r L w Y + =  is not directly observable, Wan assumed  0 2 L L γ =  and 0 2 K K γ = , where γ  
is some constant. Then it follows that, with constant returns to scale, the only assumption Wan 
claims it is necessary to make is,  0 2 Y Y γ = . This implies that ) K r L w ( ) K r L w ( TE 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 + − + = γ γ . 
Wan’s measure of the rate of technical progress (or total factor productivity) as the ratio 
of TE  over year one’s output ( 1 Y ) is (since  0 2 /Y Y = γ  and  1 2 Y Y = ):  
 
() ( )
() 1 1 1 1
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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) / (
K w L w





=      (1) 
 
where TE  denotes technical efficiency and measures the saving in costs resulting from the need 
to use less inputs due to the benefits of technical progress, and all the variables on the right-hand 
side are observable. 
It is important to note that Wan did not use the marginal productivity conditions, made no 
assumption about the state of competition, and that parameters such as the elasticity of 
substitution did not even play an indirect role in his calculations. The reason, as we shall show, is 
that Wan derived his results simply from the manipulation of the National Income and Product 
Accounts (NIPA) accounting identity, according to which value-added (Y ) equals the wage bill 
(W ) plus profits (Π), that is,  Π + ≡W Y . As algebraically,  t t t L w W ≡  and  t t t K r ≡ Π , where w 
and r  are the average wage rate and the ex post average profit rate, then, 
 
t t t t t t t K r L w W Y + ≡ Π + ≡       ( 2 )  
   6
This accounting identity does not depend on any state of competition, or on the marginal 
productivity theory of factor pricing, and is not derived from Euler’s theorem. Hence it is not a 
behavioral relationship; the symbol ≡ denotes that expression (2) is true by definition. 










t t K s L s r s w s y ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ + + + ≡      (3) 
 
where the symbol ^ denotes the growth rates of the corresponding variables in the identity and 
t t t t t
L
t Y / ) L w ( Y / W s ≡ ≡  and  t t t t t
K
t Y K r Y s / ) ( / ≡ Π ≡  are the labor and capital shares in output, 










t K s L s y r s w s λ ≡ − − ≡ + ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ      (4) 
 
However note that Wan’s definition of total factor productivity growth, equation (1), can 
be rewritten as: 
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1
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where  1 1 1 1 / ) ( Y L w s
L ≡  and  1 1 1 1 / ) ( Y L r s
K ≡  are the factor shares. Equation (6) is equivalent to 




                                                 
3 This is true except for the fact that the growth rates of the wage and profit rates are defined as  1 0 1 X / ) X X ( −  
instead of  0 0 1 X / ) X X ( − . This is certainly a minor issue. There is also the issue of the difference between the ex 
post profit rate and the user cost of capital. On this, see Felipe and McCombie (1999, 2007)   7
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The discussion above leads to the conclusion that Wan’s approach is problematic and 
thus it cannot be referred to as “new” in any way. Wan started off by writing the value-added 
accounting identity and he simply transformed it into an equivalent form. However, since one 
cannot infer anything about the rate of technical change solely from an identity, it must be 
concluded that his method suffers from serious limitations. 
 
2.2 Chow’s Estimation of Technical Progress 
We move to a different type of critique. It is an extension of the argument in section 2.1, which 
we take to its logical conclusions. In a well-known paper to China specialists, Chow (1993) 
estimated Cobb-Douglas aggregate production functions for the Chinese economy (for the total 
economy and sectors) and estimated the rate of total factor productivity growth for 1952–80. His 
results yielded the important conclusion that technical progress had been absent in China during 
1952–80. In a more recent paper, Chow (2006) used the same method (i.e., estimation of   8
aggregate production functions) and emphasized the validity of the procedure. However, as we 
shall show, the method is problematic. 





t o t ε K   L   ) t λ exp( A Y
2 1 = , where t  is a time trend and  t ε  is the disturbance term, to data for 
Chinese total output and five sectors (agriculture, industry, construction, transportation, and 
commerce). Here, λ measures the annual rate of TFP growth. After carefully compiling data on 
income, employment, and capital, Chow first ran various regressions (with different estimates of 
the capital stock) for total output data excluding the years 1958 to 1969. This is due to the 
assumption that the years 1958–69 were abnormal due to the great upheavals of the Great Leap 
Forward movement and the Cultural Revolution (the number of observations was thus reduced 
from 28 to 17). Chow argued that “to exclude the years from 1958 to 1969 in estimating an 
aggregate production function is a reasonable and rewarding procedure” (Chow 1993: 821). In 
other words, Chow argued that during the Cultural Revolution, China was not on the production 
possibility frontier. Hence, observations from that period should not be taken as reflecting the 
same production function as observations from other periods. From the statistical point of view, 
however, this can be viewed as an exercise in data mining. Even though these excluded years 
saw a collapse in total output (the value in 1962 was only 64% of the value of 1959) followed by 
a rapid recovery (1966 was 177% of the 1962 value), this should not affect the parameters of the 
production function, if indeed the data were estimating the latter. The fall in the flow of the 
services of inputs should lead to a decline in output that should be closely predicted by the 
production function.
4 Indeed, figure 2 for the construction sector shows such decline. Chow 
argued that “if a reader still wishes to question the exclusion of these years, my answer is that it 
is interesting to find out how abnormal the excluded years are if the remaining years up to 1980 
are assumed normal years […] Data are provided in this paper for any reader who wishes to 
                                                 
4 Borensztein and Ostry (1996), surprisingly, justify Chow’s approach on the following grounds: “One approach is 
to see which combinations of output, labor, and capital, are consistent with the hypothesis of a stable aggregate 
production function. On this basis, Gregory C. Chow (1993) excludes the period from 1958 (when the Great Leap 
Forward began) to 1969 (the first year of positive growth following the end of the Cultural Revolution), finding that 
for the remaining years, combinations of (logs of) output and capital per worker are fairly close to a straight line” 
(Borenzstein and Ostry 1996: 225; italics added).   9





  Data Source: Chow (1993). Logarithmic scale 
 
  Chow’s work suffers from two related problems. First, it has been known for decades that 
aggregate production functions can be justified theoretically only under extremely restrictive 
assumptions. For practical purposes, this means that they do not exist (Felipe and Fisher 2003, 
2006). Economists continue using them because it seems that at times they yield seemingly 
sensible results in empirical estimations. This is, implicitly, Chow’s (2006: 192) argument. 
Chow’s (2006: 191) self-reassurance that his results are meaningful because they agree with 
Mankiw, Romer, and Weil’s (1992) findings is also dubious, for they estimated the steady-state 
solution of Solow’s model, unrelated to Chow’s exercise (on this, see Felipe and McCombie 
2005).
6 This point is not just an obscure theoretical result without implications for empirical 
work. On the contrary, it undermines the whole rationale for estimating aggregate production 
                                                 
5 It is worth noting that something similar happened to Cobb and Douglas in their pioneering study. There, they 
estimated their production function for 1899–1922. However, they noted that 1920–21 saw a fall in output of just 
under 30%, and 1921–22 saw a recovery of a similar magnitude. However, in this case, if the last three years are 
dropped from the regression, it yields very poor results. Only the regression with the complete period yields sensible 
results. See Felipe and Adams (2005). 
6 Holz (2006: 196), in his reply to Chow (2006), questioned “the existence of an economy-wide aggregate 
production function.” Holz was clearly referring to the aggregation problem in production functions. Personal 
correspondence with Carsten Holz. 
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functions and interpreting their results (i.e., coefficients, elasticity of substitution) in the standard 
manner. 
  The second concern with Chow’s work provides an explanation for why, despite the fact 
that aggregate production functions do not exist, they appear to work at times in empirical work. 
It can be shown, pace Chow, that there is no need to eliminate any year whatsoever to obtain 
excellent estimates of the Cobb-Douglas production function. The reason is that the regressions 
Chow estimated (Cobb-Douglas “aggregate production functions”) can be derived as an 
algebraic transformation of the NIPA accounting identity, expression (2). As an implication, we 
shall show that Chow’s (1993) argument about the lack of total factor productivity growth in the 
Chinese economy during 1952–80 is the result of a peculiar misspecification problem. 
  It can be shown that a form that resembles a Cobb-Douglas production function can be 
easily derived from the NIPA identity, expression (2). This identity in growth rates is expression 
(3), above. Suppose now, first, that in China factor shares were constant during the period under 
consideration; and second, that wage and profit rates grew at constant rates (i.e., the sum of the 
growth rates of the wage and profit rates, each weighted by its factor share, is a constant). This 
implies that expression (3) becomes: 
 




t K ˆ s L ˆ s y ˆ + + ≡ λ        ( 7 )  
 
where  r s w s
K L ˆ ˆ + ≡ λ . If we integrate expression (5) and take the anti-logarithm we obtain  
 




t o t K   L   ) t exp( A Y λ ≡       ( 8 )  
 
  This expression, and this is the key issue, is not the Cobb-Douglas production function, 
but the NIPA identity rewritten under the two said assumptions about the factor shares and the 
wage and profit rates. This deceptively simple argument explains what Chow (1993) did and the 
reason why he was led to believe that neoclassical production theory can explain growth and 
productivity in China. Before we go into more detail about the argument and its far-reaching 
implications, let’s take a look at the four regressions in table 1 for the Chinese construction 
sector, estimated using Chow’s (1993) data set.   11
The first regression reproduces Chow’s (1993: table XII) results. This regression was 
estimated for 1954–80, but eliminating the years 1961, 1962, and 1968. The statistical 
insignificance of the time trend (also found in similar regressions for other sectors of the 
economy) led Chow to the conclusion that there had not been any positive technological progress 
in China during the period analyzed. The second regression was estimated using the complete 
period provided by Chow (1993) in his paper and without eliminating a single year. The problem 
with this regression is that the stock of capital bears a negative sign, hence it could not be 
accepted. This is the problem Chow encountered and putatively solved by arguing that the 
Cultural Revolution was an anomalous period, and for this reason the years corresponding to this 
period had to be excluded from the analysis. Notwithstanding the results, it is worth indicating 
that the proxy for the rate of technical progress, the time trend, is statistically significant. 
However, the statistical insignificance of the logarithm of the capital stock, which occurred in a 
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Source: Authors’ estimations using Chow’s (1993) data set 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses. Data: Chow (1993) 
 
The third regression in table 1 has been also estimated for the full period 1952–85 and 
also without excluding a single year. The difference is that now this regression includes the 
variable 
* t , which is not an exponential time trend but the function, 
) t log( ) t cos( ) t cos( ) t cos( ) t cos( ) t sin( ) t sin( ) t sin( t
* 2 5 3 2 4 3 2 + + − − + + + = , where sin denotes 
the sine function, cos  the cosine function, log  is the logarithmic function, and t  represents time. 
The regression was also estimated for different subperiods (1954–80, the same as Chow, shown 
in the last row) to test its robustness. The predictive failure test, recursive estimates, and Chow’s 
stability test indicate no structural break and stable coefficients. Moreover, the estimated 
coefficients resemble, as in Chow’s regression, the factor shares. Finally, the coefficient of  
* t  is 
statistically significant. 
  Why these substantial differences in results and why the trigonometric function? The 
derivation of equation (8) above indicates that if it were estimated with the coefficients 
unrestricted, it should have to work very well empirically provided factor shares are 
approximately constant and wage and profit rates grow at constant rates, that is, if  r s w s
K L ˆ ˆ + ≅ λ . 
In other words, if these two assumptions happen to be correct in China, and one gets data on   13




t o t ε K   L   ) t λ exp( A Y
2 1 =  will yield a very high fit (close 
to one), 
L s ≅ 1 θ  and  
K s ≅ 2 θ . This is exclusively because of the underlying accounting identity. 
Most likely, factor shares in China have been sufficiently constant (see Young 2000: 
table XXIII) for purposes of econometric estimation, as factor shares do not fluctuate widely 





t o t ε K   L   ) t λ exp( A Y
2 1 =  did not result in a good approximation to the identity (second regression 
in table 1) it was most likely because the second assumption (that wage and profit rates grew at a 




t t r s w s ˆ ˆ + ≡ λ  is a 
constant. Hence, the approximation of  t λ  through the linear trend was erroneous and led to the 
biased estimates that resulted when all years were included in his regressions. This was caused 
by a misspecification error, though not in the usual sense in econometrics, but in the sense of 
choosing an incorrect approximation to the income identity. What can be done? Returning to 
expression (3), if we make only the assumption that factor shares are constant, substitution into 
expression (3) and integration yields (taking antilogarithms) 





t o t K L r w A Y    
K s
t ≡ , an even more 
general approximation to the accounting identity than expression (8), as it only depends on one 
assumption, the constancy of factor shares. 
The previous arguments imply that the way to improve upon Chow’s poor results when 




t (or  t
K
t
L r ln s w ln s +   
in logarithms) as a function of time (but not a linear trend). Given that this variable most likely 
fluctuates cyclically around an upward trend in the case of China, a trigonometric function 
probably would do a better job, as indeed was the case (the variable 
* t  above), which led to the 
approximation to the identity. This way, the latter (strictly speaking, a very good approximation 
to it) was recovered. It must be stressed that the whole exercise is pointless from an economic 
point of view as all is being estimated is an identity, or an approximation to it.  
To complete the argument it is important to emphasize that the function 
* t  is simply a 






                                                 
7 A word of caution: the expression  LnK LnL t 412 . 0 412 . 0 034 . 0 967 . 0
* + + +  is not a perfect approximation to 
the accounting identity. The perfect approximation would involve perhaps more complicated terms (and hours in 
front of the computer). The main purpose of the exercise is to show intuitively why Chow’s exercise and 
conclusions are questionable. Besides, we do not have the wage and profit rate series to construct the full identity.   14
Nothing in neoclassical economics indicates that the function of time in the production function 
(which supposedly captures technical progress) has to be linear; linearity is merely a convenient 
assumption. Figure 3 plots (
* t   .034 0 ) for 34 periods (1952–85), where  034 0.  is the estimate of 
* t (see third regression in table 1). 
 
 
Note:  ) t log( ) t cos( ) t cos( ) t cos( ) t cos( ) t sin( ) t sin( ) t sin( t
* 2 5 3 2 4 3 2 + + − − + + + =  and 0.034 
is the estimated coefficient (see third regression in table 1). 
 
Chow argued that it is easy to explain why there was no technical change in China before 
the reforms started. “There is no reason to assume that technical progress occurred during the 
period up to 1980. Economic co-operation with the Soviet Union ended in the 1960s. Without 
incentive from private enterprises, where could technological progress have come? I have found 
no theory to support the assertion that central planning will produce technological progress” 
(Chow 1993: 841). The same data, however, could equally tell another story, namely, one of 
rapid technological progress, but where a fast growth of the labor force, together with the 
existence of surplus labor, led to a situation where the weighted average of the growth rates of 
the wage and the implied profit rate did not increase markedly over time. 
                                                                                                                                                             
The reader may wonder how we came up with such complicated trigonometric function. This was the result of trial 
and error. Knowing that we were searching for an approximation to the accounting identity, we graphed 
t t t K ln L ln Y ln 2 1 θ θ − −  for different values of  1 θ  and  2 θ . It is a series with an upward trend that fluctuates. 
This indicated that we were looking for a trigonometric function. 
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  This analysis leads us to question Chow’s overall conclusions about the lack of technical 
progress in China. Even assuming that China’s aggregate production function exists, we have 
shown that one does not need to eliminate certain years from the regression to obtain “good” 
results, including a statistically significant estimate of the proxy for the rate of technical 
progress. Second, under the premise that the aggregate production function does not exist, 
Chow’s exercise can be viewed as simply one for the search of a good approximation to the 
income accounting identity. It may well be that technical progress in China between the 1950s 
and 1980s was zero. Our point is simply that the methodology used by Chow is not suited to 
answer this question. 
 
3. THE NEOCLASSICAL MODEL OF INVESTMENT 
 
In this section we further elaborate upon the same two themes, i.e., the problems posed by the 
underlying accounting identity and the question of whether or not the neoclassical model suits 
the Chinese conditions, in the context of modeling investment in China. In a recent paper, He 
and Qin (2004) (see also Song et al. [2001]) have made a worthy attempt at answering the 
important and difficult question of what are the driving forces behind China’s fast-growing 
domestic investment. This is a very complex task given that modeling investment has always 
been a very hard undertaking, which in the case of China is compounded by the fact that the 
country has been in a state of transition for about 30 years. Hence it is not clear which theoretical 
approach one should follow. The Polish economist Michal Kalecki (1971) once commented that: 
“The determination of investment decisions by, broadly speaking, the level and rate of change of 
economic activity […] remains the pièce de résistence of economics” Kalecki (1971: 165). Years 
later, Blanchard still felt the same way: “The discrepancy between theory and empirical work is 
perhaps nowhere in macroeconomics so obvious as in the case of the aggregate investment 
function” (Blanchard 1986). 
 
3.1 Chinese Business Sector Investment 
He and Qin (2004) divided Chinese domestic investment into business sector investment ( B I )—
composed of state-owned enterprises, collective-owned enterprises, and private enterprises—and 
government investment ( G I ). Following Song, Liu, and Ping (2001: 232), He and Qin (2004)   16
argued that in the light of the fact that China’s investment system has changed profoundly since 
the transition process began, and that the business motives of most Chinese firms have become 
more market-oriented since the 1990s, it is appropriate to model  B I  by the “orthodox factor-
input demand model” (He and Qin 2004: 103). By this, the authors meant the neoclassical model 
of investment (see Jorgenson 1963). In this section we discuss the modeling of  B I . Regarding 
government investment ( G I ),He and Qin (2004) modeled it as a mixture of policy targets and 
supply-side constraints. We review this in the next section. 
In the neoclassical theory of investment (Jorgenson 1963), output and the cost of capital 
are the variables determining the optimal capital stock, while investment represents the 
adjustment from the actual to the optimal (desired) capital stock. Jorgenson assumed that firms 
choose their long-run desired capital stock (
*
B K ) by optimizing their factor demand subject to a 
constant returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas production function (the assumption about the form of 
the production function is not a crucial feature of the model). This leads to the first-order 
condition ) / (
* r Y KB θ = , where θ  is the elasticity of output (Y) with respect to capital, and r  is 
the user cost of capital. Desired investment (
*








Bt K ) K K ( I − − + − = δ , 
where δ  is the constant depreciation rate. From the first-order condition and the motion of 
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where the symbol Δ denotes the difference in the values of a variable between two consecutive 
periods. He and Qin (2004) argue that this equation resembles a standard error correction model 









B θδ . 
Moreover, the authors argue that “considering the possibility that the Chinese business-sector 
investment may also be affected by the government policies, we extend that equilibrium relation 
by adding government direct investment as a new explanatory variable” (He and Qin 2004: 104). 
Thus, the hypothesized long-run relationship becomes  3 2 1 α α α θδ ) I ( r Y I *
G
*





B I ln r ln Y ln I ln 3 2 1 0 α α α α + + + = , with expected estimates  ) ln(θδ α = 0 ,  1 1 = α , 
and  1 2 − = α . 
For econometric purposes, this long-run relationship was embedded in a dynamic 
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where 
3 2 1 ) (
* * α α α θδ G B I r Y I E − =  denotes the disequilibrium term (the ECM term) and ε  is the 
disturbance. The equation was estimated with quarterly data using the actual values of 
investment (that is, for practical purposes, all variables used were the actual values, without the 
asterisk) for the period 1994Q4–2001Q4. The authors showed that the estimated model passed 
the standard diagnostic tests (autocorrelation, normality, heteroscedasticity, and functional form) 
and they could not reject the hypothesis that  1 1 = α , and  1 2 − = α . Based on the good econometric 
results obtained He and Qin (2004: 110) concluded that the long-run solution derived from their 
alleged model suggests “strongly that aggregate business investment demand is now largely 
market-driven in the PRC.” 
 
3.2 Once Again, the Underlying Accounting Identity 
To see the problem with equation (9), above, consider first the definition of the capital share 
(
K
t s ) in output (which is obviously part of the accounting identity (2)), namely,  t t
K
t Y / s Π ≡ , 
where  t t t K r ≡ Π  denotes total profits (surplus in the NIPA terminology), written as the product of 







s ≡        ( 1 1 )  
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The symbol ≡ denotes that expression (9) is true by definition, in the sense that it is an 
accounting identity, not a behavioral relationship.
8  
Likewise, define the law of motion of the stock of capital as: 
 
1 t t t K ) 1 ( I K − − + ≡ δ        ( 1 2 )  
 
which obviously is also an accounting identity. 
By rewriting expression (12) for investment, substituting for the stock of capital from 
identity (11), and assuming only that the capital share is constant (i.e., 
K K
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s I I I δ      (14) 
 
The obvious point behind expression (14) is that it is identical to equation (9), the one 
specified by He and Qin (2004). It must be stressed that expression (14) is an accounting identity 
that has been derived as a transformation of two other accounting identities. The only assumption 
made to derive expression (14) is that the capital share is constant (
K K
t s s = ), something that can 
be verified or refuted very easily. The conclusion is that expression (14), like all near tautologies, 
is consistent with any macroeconomic dataset and therefore is not useful for testing theories. 
                                                 




t Y / W s 1 s ≡ − ≡ , where  t W  denotes the total wage bill. 
The latter can be written as the product of the average wage ( t w ) rate times employment ( t L ), that is,  t t t L w W ≡ . 
It should be clear that any system of consistent accounts (e.g., the National Income and Product Accounts [NIPA] of 
any country, including those of China, from which the factor shares can be inferred) provides output (Y) as the sum 
of the total wage bill (W) plus total profits (Π ), that is  t t t W Y Π + ≡ . Hence, it is arithmetically possible and 
correct to express output as  t t t t t K r L w Y + ≡ . The fact that some countries do not collect data that allow the 
construction of  t t t W Y Π + ≡  does not undermine the theoretical argument. Nevertheless, this is not the case of 
China.   19
































b I ζ        (15) 
 
where  δ ζ
K s − = 1 , will be a pointless exercise since one knows, ex ante, that the result will be 
K s b = 1  and  1 2 − = b  (the supposed speed of adjustment to the long-run equilibrium in an error 
correction model!), and a perfect statistical fit (there is no error term of any kind).
9 Certainly, if 
the assumption about the constancy of the capital share were incorrect, then estimation of 
expression (15) using standard regression methods (e.g., OLS, IV) would not yield a perfect fit, 
and the estimated parameters would diverge from the theoretical values. But such result would 
only mean that capital’s share is not sufficiently constant.
10 The general argument about 
expression (15) would remain valid. The conclusion is that the hypothesis that expression (13) is 
a good explanation of investment in China can never be rejected statistically; hence, it cannot be 
postulated as a model to explain investment behavior because it is not falsifiable. 
He and Qin (2004), however, did not obtain a perfect fit when they estimated their model. 
This is because they did not estimate equation (9). As noted above, they estimated equation (10), 
which includes lags of the variables, and estimated an error correction model. This led to the 
introduction of important differences with respect to the original model, equation (9). Moreover, 
He and Qin (2004) introduced government investment ( G I ) into the specification.
11  
Summing up, in our view, He and Qin’s (2004: 110) conclusion that the long-run solution 
derived from their alleged model suggests strongly that aggregate business investment demand is 
now largely market-driven in the PRC is unwarranted. The conclusion of this subsection is that 
                                                 
9 Of course, no actual data set will display a perfect constancy of the factor shares. For econometric purposes, this 
condition must be understood as “roughly” constant. 
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11 There is a slight conceptual difference worth mentioning. In neoclassical specifications, authors use the “user cost 
of capital” instead of the profit rate. The conceptual difference is discussed in Felipe and McCombie (2007).   20
the Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ADL) the authors estimated is only vaguely related to the 
theoretical framework that they argue underlies it, namely, the neoclassical model of investment. 
While the authors started by assuming a relationship derived from this theory, the equation they 
end up estimating is so different that virtually has no relationship with the model. Hence, it is 
impossible to interpret it. 
 
3.3. Modeling Chinese Government Sector Investment 
Given the lack of a sound theory to model the Chinese government sector investment, the authors 
take a very simple approach. They propose the long-run relationship: 
 
u ) Y / Y ln( G ln I ln 3
T
2 R 1 0
*




G I  is the desired level of government investment,  R G  is government revenue, Y  is actual 
output, 
T Y  is the long-run trend of output—thus (
T Y / Y ) measures the deviations of actual 
output from its long-run trend—and u is the unemployment rate, with expected signs  0 1 > β , 
0 2 < β , and  0 3 > β . As in the case of the business-sector investment, this hypothesized long-run 
relationship is inserted into a dynamic equation in growth rates. Again, empirically, actual values 
(without asterisk) were used. Despite that the authors did not model government sector 
investment according to the neoclassical model they tried to interpret the results within the 
framework of neoclassical theory, as we shall see. 
A key aspect of equation (16) is that it contains the long-run trend of output 
T Y , which is 
unobservable and hence has to be estimated. The authors argue that they define 
T Y as the 
“symbolically market-driven Cobb-Douglas production function with constant returns to scale to 
reflect the long-run prospect 
θ θ − =
1 L AK Y
T ” (He and Qin 2004: 105, italics added). This is 
certainly a most unusual definition of a production function and there is no explanation of what it 
means. The procedure followed to estimate 
T Y  is the standard one of the fitting production 
function  t t ) L / K ln( A ln ) L / Y ln( θ + =  and then using the fitted value (Y ˆ ) to approximate the 
long-run trend 
T Y .
12 For empirical purposes, He and Qin (2004) used also an autoregressive 
distributed lag specification with a view to splitting short- and long-run dynamics. What is 
                                                 
12 For a similar procedure see Heytens and Zebregs (2003).   21
interesting is the result obtained for the elasticity of output with respect to capital: θ =0.95. Since 
the authors thought that there was something wrong with this result, they “experimented” (He 
and Qin 2004: 112) and settled for a not much different value of θ =0.85. 
Given the authors’ statement that “this parameter is normally found to be well below 0.5 
in most market economies” (He and Qin 2004: 112), it seems that what they mean by a 
“symbolically market-driven” production function is simply a production function such that 
when estimated the results are consistent with the existence of competitive markets, that is, that 
the factor elasticities equal the factor shares in the NIPA.
13 The NIPA of the advanced countries 
report a capital share in the neighborhood of 0.25–0.30. Why the authors did not obtain a value 
of θ  close to the capital share is easy to explain, as the reason is the same as that outlined in 
section 2.2, in the context of Chow’s (1993) work. It seems odd that the postulated production 
function does not include any variable to account for technological progress (presumably a very 
important factor in China during the period of estimation, 1994Q4–2001Q4), not even the 
standard exponential time trend, i.e.,  t t t t L K t A Y ε λ
θ θ − =
1 ) exp( . We conjecture that the reason is 
poor econometric results as a consequence of the fact that the linear trend provides a bad 
approximation to the weighted average of the growth rates of the wage and profit rates. Hence 
He and Qin (2004) had to settle for a production function which, although in neoclassical terms 
missed an important feature of the Chinese economy (technical progress), it had, at least, factor 
elasticties that could be explained. For purposes of He and Qin’s (2004) work, our argument 
implies that if they had used the correct approximation to the identity, the fitted value of output 
from the aggregate production function (Y ˆ ) would have to be (almost) identical to the actual 
value of output, hence  Y Y Y ˆ T ≅ ≅ , and deviations from “trend” (
T Y Y − ) , i.e., the output gap, 
should be very close to zero. A corollary of this result is that the production function approach to 





                                                 
13 The empirical evidence, however, does not corroborate this statement (see Sylos-Labini 1995). In general, 
estimation of Cobb-Douglas functions with time-series data leads to poor results (see the discussion in section 2.2). 
The implausible results that often appear with time-series data estimating the simple Cobb-Douglas with a time 
trend is a well-known problem to those who estimate production functions; see also Felipe and Adams (2005).   22
4. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper has delved into the general question of the validity of the neoclassical theory to model 
technical progress and investment in China. Our overall assessment is that this is a very 
problematic route. In the three cases analyzed here, the equations used in the analysis have led to 
apparently sensible results for misinformed reasons. The reason is that they can be interpreted as 
approximations to accounting identities. Chow, quoted in the introduction to this paper, argued 
that “before new tools are developed for China, one should understand the usefulness as well as 
the limitations of the existing tools.” Perhaps such time has arrived. We are convinced that 
further efforts are clearly needed.  
Is there any alternative? One view, rather nihilistic, is that there is no way out, as 
aggregate “technical progress” and “investment” are problematic concepts due to the aggregation 
problems in production functions (Felipe and Fisher 2003, 2006). It has been known for decades 
that the conditions to theoretically derive an aggregate production function are so stringent that it 
is difficult to believe that real economies can satisfy them. On the quantification of the role of 
technological progress, the neoclassical aggregate production function, with its emphasis on 
splitting the alleged contributions of factor accumulation and technical progress to overall output 
growth is an avenue that should be discarded (Scott 1989; Nelson 1973, 1981, 1998). Moreover, 
simulation analyses by Felipe and McCombie (2006) show that the true rate of technical 
progress, estimated with physical data, differs substantially from the rate of TFP growth, 
calculated with aggregate data in value terms. The latter is simply, as usually estimated, a 
measure of changes in distributional income.  
Although the above is a position that we fundamentally believe is correct, perhaps there 
are some other options that allow researchers to gain useful insights. Estimation of technical 
progress should once-and-for-all abandon the neoclassical framework (either growth accounting 
exercises or estimation of aggregate production functions). The recent work of Hausmann, 
Hwang, and Rodrik (2007) and Hidalgo et al. (2007) is a welcome advance (the latter using 
network theory) towards understanding how countries progress by looking at the products that 
they export successfully and the capabilities needed to do so. A measure of the sophistication of 
a country’s export basket has proven to be a good predictor of future growth: controlling for 
initial income, countries with a more sophisticated export basket (also initially) grow faster.   23
Hidalgo et al. (2007) argue that development has to be understood as a process of accumulating 
more complex sets of capabilities and finding paths that create incentives for those capabilities to 
be accumulated and used. To this purpose they introduce a new analytical tool called the product 
space. Abdon et al. (2010), Felipe, Kumar, and Abdon (2010), and Felipe et al. (2010) use it to 
study China’s performance and show that the progress that the country has seen for decades 
cannot be explained without understanding how it transformed, upgraded, and diversified its 
export basket; this could be done only through the mastering of more complex capabilities. 
On modeling investment in China, a less radical view is to consider aggregate investment 
as a meaningful economic concept, but then model it outside the realm of neoclassical 
economics. Efforts must be developed towards: (i) incorporating elements from development 
theory that apply to the Chinese economy; (ii) incorporating the role of expectations, a crucial 
aspect of any realistic model of capital accumulation (e.g., see Heye 1995); and (iii) 
incorporating the role of profits as a source of investment. Kalecki (1971) emphasized the 
importance of reinvested profits as a source of investment, profit rates (in particular, the 
difference between the expected rate of profitability and the interest rate), and capacity 
utilization.
14 The idea that investment depends upon profits is amongst the oldest of 
macroeconomic relations. If indeed China’s private sector is behaving more like a market 
economy, then surely a proxy for the profitability of investment (e.g., the average profit rate) and 
profits themselves will play an important role in modeling investment (e.g., Sun 1998). 
                                                 
14 For estimates of profitability for China, see Holz (2002).   24
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